Q. You're a Northrop man, and Northrop lost to the F-22. Would things be different if the F-23 had won?
COL. RICCIONI: No, absolutely not. I mean, the airplanes are both designed to the same specifications. They both are observing the requirements of the Air Force, and they were very close in most ways. You know, I’ve been filled with the Northrop propaganda on how much better it was in stealth, and so on, but the fact is that both airplanes would be as expensive. No, there would be no difference.
Вопр. Вы сами из нортропа. Как думаете поменялось ли бы что нибудь если бы выиграл ф-23.
Отв. Нет, ничего. Оба самолета спроектированы под требования ввс и очень друг на друга похожи. И оба страшно дорогие.
But that was promised with the Phoenix missile. The Phoenix missile had the promise of being able to shoot beyond — I mean, at very long ranges, against multiple targets. And the Phoenix has been fired, I found out, twice in anger in the last four or five years. Twice in anger. And didn’t get a kill. But that’s neither here nor there.
Для ур феникс была обещана стрельба на очень большую дальность по многим целям одновременно. Как я узнал за последние 4-5 лет фениксом в боевых условиях стреляли дважды. Оба раза промахнулись.
Q. Your sixth thing that you mentioned.
COL. RICCIONI: Oh, okay, I’m glad you brought that up, my lady. Somebody’s got a good memory; I haven't. If you redefine stealth as how frequently the enemy sees an airplane, or how infrequently the enemy will see the airplane, then it isn’t the technology that gives you stealth on the F-22. It’s a by-product of the technology called the cost. Since you're going to buy so few of them, the enemy will seldom see them. So it’s really the cost that makes the airplane stealthy, not the technology.
Ну и 6 компонент малозаметности – цена. Если вы купите слишком мало самолетов из-за их цены, то враг их редко будет замечать в небе.
You know, if you send 70 airplanes out to the Pacific to fight in that area and attack a country as expansive as China, the Chinese commanders will be wondering which province you’re operating against. Cost is stealth.
Если вы пошлете 70 самолетов в атаку на страну размером с Китай, китайцы решат что вы воюете только с одной из их провинций.
You know, there was another classic example of unilateral disarmament, and, again, maybe it wasn’t necessary. Strategic Air Command was operating 1,360 bombers — 1,360 B-47s. Then they bought 680 B-52s to replace them. As the B-52s got older, they were going to buy 206 — shades of the F-22 — they were going to buy about 250 B-1Bs. They bought 100 B-1Bs for the total program cost. And then for the total program cost they bought 20 B-2s. They were supposed to buy 135 B-2s for $40 billion. And incidentally, on black programs, when you get a cost number on a black program, be very leery of it. You’re not getting it all. It’s hidden. It’s hidden from the enemy, the people, and their representatives.
Напомню о нашем бомбардировочном командовании. Сперва у них было 1360 в-47, потом 680 в-52, потом они собирались купить 250 в-1, но из-за роста цены смогли купить только 100, и наконец они купили 20 в-2, хотя собирались 135.
Ну и для тех кто ценит хороший юмор от американских военных планировщиков или о том что задумывалось получить (и пусть после этого кто нибудь госплан покритикует)
The dream mission, or the dream for this airplane was really quite good. It was intended to provide the United States with dominance of the air beyond the year 2005 and specifically designed against a very specific enemy. It was meant to do offensive counter-air operations deep in the heart of Russia. And to that end, the airplane was going to perform a very aggressive mission, which was a 100 mile flight to the borders of Russia, then a 400 mile supersonic penetration, supersonic for survivability, and then do its combat and fly 400 miles out and then 100 miles back to the home base. A very ambitious mission.
Он был задуман для проведения противовоздушных операций глубоко внутри России после 2005 года. Самолет должен был выполнять очень агрессивную задачу, состоящую из 160 км полета до границы России, последующего 640 км сверхзвукового броска, затем вести воздушный бой и возвращение по аналогичной схеме.
The beauty of it is that it was all to be done for an airplane that was to cost $35 million, which, in 1982, which is when it was specified, or 1980, that was precisely the cost of F-15. These are unit fly-away costs, by the way, so the $35 million would translate in today’s inflated dollars and in total program costs, it would translate to about $40 [million] to $50 million. So that’s the cost that we’ll compare later.
Самое замечательное было в том, что это должно было быть в самолете стоящем 35 лимонов, что в то время было равно стоимости ф-15. С учетом инфляции сейчас это должно было бы быть между 40 и 50.
А это так, довесок, о другом вундерваффе
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By 1988, testing revealed that the B-1's sophisticated avionics system - its threat-warning and radar-jamming systems - had a serious structural flaw. Essentially, the aircraft's defensive and offensive systems were jamming each other. The result was that the pilot had to choose between protecting himself or carrying out his mission. More than a decade later, some of the plane's avionics problems have yet to be fully resolved.
В 1988 было обнаружено что станция рэб б-1 глушит и его собственную станцию предупреждения об облучении (конструктивный просчет). Некоторые проблемы с брэо не были полностью устранены и через 10 лет.
In 1991, when the U.S. launched the air war against Iraq, the entire B- 1 fleet was grounded due to catastrophic engine blade failures. Munitions limitations, inadequate crew training, and electronic warfare deficiencies also played a part in the aircraft not making an appearance during the Persian Gulf War.
В 1991 во время начала войны с ираком полеты всех б-1 были запрещены из-за проблем с турбинными лопатками. …плохая подготовка экипажей и недостатки системы рэб тоже мешали его применению в войне с ираком.
Also in 1991, it was publicly revealed that although the B-1's mission included flying at high altitudes, its de-icing system didn't work.
В 1991 было публично признано что антиобледенительная система самолета не работает.
The Air Force continues to report a large number of troublesome parts on the B-1, particularly related to the aircraft's aging avionics, cockpit displays, and its ALQ-161 electronic jammer.
ВВС продолжают сообщать о проблемах с системами в-1, особенно с брэо, дисплеями и станцией помех ALQ-161