Развитие авианесущих кораблей России/СССР

Возвращаясь к вопросу о размере авианосцев и эффективности их при меньшем размере - небольшой, но при этом достаточно полный обзор по американскому опыту за последние полвека. (заранее извиняюсь за длинный английский текст, ничего лучшего нету):

Attempts by the USN in the modern era to build smaller, cheaper carriers start in the late 1950's when the staggering cost of CVAN 65 USS Enterprise was beginning to be appreciated. One attempt to reduce her size (and cost) resulted in a ship 25ft shorter and 5,000 tons lighter at full load that had to omit ALL side protection to accomplish a savings of $5m out of a total projected cost of $314m. Not really worth it. An attempt to design a smaller, more affordable CVN in 1960 resulted in a ship almost 200ft shorter than CVAN65 and of about 60,000 vs. 85,000 tons. It sacrificed 2.5ft of hangar height, could only handle an aircraft of up to 50,000lb vs. 80,000lb and had a total capacity of 750 vs 1,347 tons of aircraft. It sacrificed half the catapults and elevators, and on half the propulsion plant could not make the 30 knots deemed the minimum acceptable speed for a carrier at the time. It could carry 75% of the aviation fuel of Enterprise and 90% of the ordnance so could thus sustain operations for a similar period of time, but in no way could she come close to the intensity of operations provided by Enterprise. The reduced cost did not offset the dramatically reduced capability. A smaller, "minimum carrier" studied at the same time would have been 34,700 tons (roughly Essex sized but shorter and beamier) capable of carrying out a single air strike with 600 tons of aircraft. This ship could just make 30 knots using an oil-burning plant and had 1/5 the aviation fuel capacity of Enterprise and no torpedo protection at all. It was a disposable ship, and not much of a bargain. The next attempt at a smaller, cheaper follow-on to Enterprise tried to take advantage of a projected family of more efficient reactors. Slightly smaller than a Forrestal, design 58A had 80% of Enterprises aviation fuel capacity and 3 elevators instead of the 4 of Enterprise. Protection standards would have been maintained. Aircraft capacity was 1,125 tons for 78 aircraft vs the 1,347 tons and 99 aircraft of Enterprise. Hangar height was reduced by 3ft. It would have had the same radars and Terrier air defense system then being projected for Enterprise. Cost would have been $291m vs. $314m for Enterprise. Inreasing length by 40ft would have added another $8m to the cost. Neither design could have sustained 30 knots with the 4 projected reactors. A 3 reactor version would have been cheaper at only $242m but it was even slower. All 3 compared poorly to an Enterprise on a cost vs. capability basis. The very small difference in cost did not make up for the much larger difference in capability. The most practical cheaper alternative to CVN 65 without giving up capability ended up being a return to the oil-fired Forrestal design. The next big attempt at smaller carriers came in the 1970's, pushed by people like Admiral Zumwalt. CVV was the major program, an outgrowth of Zumwalt's earlier T-CBL, proposed by Ford and championed by Carter. It would have been oil-fired and considerably smaller, with a much smaller air wing, than a repeat Nimitz. T-CBL was built to a cost ($550m in FY73 dollars) and so was not designed like ships are normally designed - starting with a threat analysis and a mission - but with a price-tag. So size, capability and to a lesser extent electronic sophistication had to be sacrificed. Also, uniquely, no air-group was specified. An air wing would have had to be hobbled together to suit the size of the ship, not any tactical mission. The number of aircraft quoted would run variously from 52 to 65 with no justification on how those numbers were reached. The design though seems to have been optimized for strike missions with the A-7 and would not have been a multi-role carrier like the Nimitz. At full load she would displace 58,897 tons, 44,500 tons light. There would have been 2 catapults and 2 elevators - a 50% reduction in capacity over a Nimitz. There were fewer ammunition elevators as well so the aircraft elevators would have to pull double-duty. The design was poorly balanced for air operations with fuel for 1.35 days of air operations but ordnance for 4.5 days in a strike configuration, a product of the ships design priorities. This discrepancy got worse if the ship was carrying fighters instead. Hangar deck height was a paltry 19 feet 6 inches. Half of the Kennedy's unreliable high-pressure plant was all that could be accomodated within the limited volume available. The ship could only make 27.8 knots clean with 26.2 knots sustained, well below the 30 knot minimum requirement. The machinery was considered vulnerable to side hits because of its densely packed nature given the limited available volume in the small hull. Defensive weapons would consist of 3 CIWS but no point defense missiles as on larger carriers. CVNX was a parralel development to the politically inspired T-CBL, with nuclear power. Several alternatives were considered. Model C was the Nimitz and was the baseline for comparison. Model A was a minimum carrier with reduced deck length, magazine volumes, two instead of 4 shafts using cruiser type reactors, 2 elevators and 2 catapults with 3 arrester wires instead of 4 and an airgroup of 48-53 aircraft on 51,900 tons light load, 64,600 tons full. JP5 capacity would be 74% of a Nimitz. Model B was the minimum to support an air group 2/3 the size of a Nimitz on 59,700 tons light, 74,800 tons FL. There would have been 3 elevators and 3 catapults and 82% of the JP 5 capacity of a Nimitz. Hangar height in both A and B dropped from the standard 25f to just 20ft. Model D was a control model, designed to test the computer program the models were being designed in. It attempted 2/3 the Nimitz air wing using the Nimitz propulsion plant. The result was nearly the size of a Nimitz at 84,400 tons vs 93,400 tons loaded, but with only 3 catapults and elevators and 92% of the JP capacity. The two-shaft models A and B were considered more vulnerable to damage and inferior in tactical mobility to a 4-shaft Nimitz. With one shaft out of action the ship might not be able to produce sufficient wind-over-deck for flight operations under many conditions. The 2 catapults/elevators of Model A resulted in a very severe reduction in the number of aircraft launched and prolonged the period necessary to steam into the wind. 3 catapults/elevators was considered the minimum acceptable. The air wings of Models A/B/D were all less effective than a Nimitz for offensive operations. It might not be possible for example, to provide strike packages with fighter escort due to the need to retain the small number of fighters available for defense of the carrier. The smaller carrier air wings might also take longer to establish air superiority in a contested area and suffer greater losses while attempting to gain air superiority. The Model A wing was considered ineffective in high-threat areas. The B/D models could do force-projection adequately, but not function as multi-role carriers like the existing CVA's and CVN's. They would require other carriers to provide ASW and AEW support for example. When CVNX died because of the above arguements, T-CBL was revived as CVV in order to get a cheap alternative to a 4th Nimitz in the budget. The cost limit was now $1.3bn FY79 dollars which meant the ship retained 2 catapults and 2 elevators but gained 2 more boilers for a total of 6. This budget conveniently did not include electronics, though these would be austere with no SPS-49 VSR and no SLQ-32 EW system, or Nixie and with a dumbed-down NTDS. Magazine protection was a considerable improvement over current practice due to the change in primary threat from torpedo's to cruise missiles. Unfortunately that had a massive negative impact on aviation ordnance capacity. Aircraft capacity would have been a very modest 607 tons with 1/3 the ordnance capacity of a Nimitz. This CVV had all the negatives of the CVNX Model A, but at lower unit cost due to the deletion of nuclear power, but showed a more modern protection scheme. Congress killed CVV, twice. Even over a presidential veto of a budget that did not include CVV. By this time the USN had started to operate in the Indian Ocean where the advantages of a nuclear power and a large air group were clearly demonstrated. The failure of CVV pointed out the real reason small carriers don't work. Congress tends to approve numbers of ships, not total dollars to be spent on ships. They don't for example, approve say $4bn for carrier construction and let the Navy do what it will with the cash. They approve individual ships. Thus to maintain a certain force level, say the 13-carrier force of the 1970's a CVV was the same as a repeat Nimitz. It was a unit acquired to maintain the specified force level. Thus individual unit cost, while important, isn't the first priority. Therefore, a CVV in 1979 represented the same political investment as a repeat Nimitz. CVV might make sense if there was assurance the unit-cost savings would buy more hulls, say on a 2 for 1 or even a 3 for 2 basis instead of a Nimitz. But the fact of the matter is the ratio would have been 1 for 1. Thus CVV could only represent a serious decline in total carrier capability. Who wants 13 CVV's if they can have 13 Nimitz instead? Anyone? Bueler? Then there's all the other advantages of a bigger carrier; ability to conduct air operations in heavier weather. Larger, more diverse air groups. Higher surge rates. Sustainability. Resistance to damage, etc., etc...

Если уж мне на авиационном ответить не могут, задам тот же вопрос здесь.

Какова тактика работы АУГ при решении задач ПВО?

Встретил мнение там и кажется Артем его тоже озвучивал. Что для отражения массированного налета на АУГ важнейшим критерием для АВ является способность быстро поднять в воздух истребители для отражения налета. И требования быстрой оперативности при старте самолетов задаются именно этой задачей.

Меня терзают смутные сомнения.
Согласно Welcome to the site of original engineers and scientistes. The source for all your Internet knowledge needs. для решения задач ПВО организуется БВП в составе 2-4 истребителей, самолета РЭБ и ДРЛО.
В случае угрозы, подымается еще пара истребителей и ДРЛО. В случае массированного налета поднимаются истребители из режима "дежурство на палубе"

Внимание вопрос
1) Успеют ли втупить в бой подымаемые по тревоге истребители. Ввиду возможного рубежа пуска ПКР в до 200-300 км.
2) Сколько самолетов находится в режиме "дежурства на палубе"? Явно не десятки. А поднять боеприпасы на палубу и снарядить самолеты - не одна минута дела.

Соответственно у меня большие сомнения, что кроме БВП кто-то еще вступит в дело. Кто-то может проянить суть дела? Нужен экстремальный подъем большого количества самолетов или нет?

Выложу давно обещанный рисунок.


Кузя с двумя катапультами и без ПКР.

здесь помещались

To Denis KA
Порадовали, порадовали, спасибо!

Что-то эта тема СЛИШКОМ длинная.


Эта нить закрыта; продолжение темы - здесь